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A
mAbstract
There is little evidence as to the effectiveness of incentives for the conversion of
fixed-term contracts into permanent jobs. We aim at filling this gap by studying a
recent Italian program which provides benefits for employers who convert contracts
for workers in specific demographic groups (females, younger men). Due to funding
constraints, the incentives were available only for a few days, allowing us to employ
a difference-in-differences strategy between similar short periods. Using administrative
microdata for the Veneto region, we show that the subsidy increased conversions by
83% on average, with no substitution effects over time or across groups of workers.
JEL codes: J21, J41, J48
Keywords: Fixed-term contracts; Permanent employment; Diff-in-diffs1 Introduction
During the last two decades, several European countries have shown a steep rise in the
use of flexible contracts. This has increased attention towards policies aimed at pro-
moting permanent employment, in particular during the ongoing economic crises. Sev-
eral possible alternatives have been proposed and implemented in different countries,
but the debate about their relative merits and problems is still open.
One solution would be to reduce the employment protection legislation of open-ended
contracts, which should increase the overall job-turnover (Bertola 1990; Boeri and
Jimeno 2005; Kugler and Pica 2008) and reduce the use of flexible contracts (Schivardi
and Torrini, 2008; Grassi, 2009). This solution is nevertheless likely to be politically
unfeasible. Another option would be to decrease the cost of permanent contracts. For
instance, Hernanz et al. (2003) evaluate a Spanish reform in 1997 that broadly fit into
this category. Although they found a positive effect on flows to permanent jobs,
Mendéz (2013) criticizes their results and suggests that there was no effect on conver-
sion rates.1 An alternative could also be to introduce a cost for terminating fixed-term
contracts instead of converting them into permanent ones, as happened with a French
reform in 2002. Maurin and Michaud (2004) provide evidence of an increase in the
proportion of temporary contracts converted into permanent ones, but they also find
that the higher costs induced a decrease in the number of new fixed-term hires. A
fourth possibility would be to subsidize any hire with a permanent contract, as done,
for instance, by an Italian program introduced in 2001 and evaluated by Cipollone and
Guelfi (2003, 2006). The main problem is that employers are unlikely to directly sign2015 Ciani and de Blasio; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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Ciani and de Blasio IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:6 Page 2 of 29permanent contracts without strong signals of high productivity from the workers.
Hence a substantial part of the incentive is likely to go to hires that would have taken
place even in the absence of a subsidy. Indeed, Cipollone and Guelfi (2003, 2006) found
no evidence of aggregate effects, but their results suggest positive effects for previously
employed individuals and for those with higher education.
Less is known about incentives targeted only to the conversion of fixed term con-
tracts.2 This kind of scheme allows employers to freely hire temporary workers, pos-
sibly generating the efficiency gains related to greater flexibility, but at the same time
reducing the risk that individuals incur in a series of fixed-term contracts. Given the in-
formation asymmetry between workers and potential employers, an incentive for a con-
tract conversion might be more effective than one for any direct hires because it
exploits the preference of employers to sign permanent contracts with workers that
have already been screened. Indeed, the empirical literature on temporary contracts
generally agrees that they represent a stepping stone to permanent employment, al-
though the size of the effect may depend on the kind of contract and characteristics of
the worker (Booth et al., 2002; Ichino et al. 2005; Picchio 2008; Barbieri and Sestito
2008; Berton et al. 2011; Bruno et al. 2012). Nevertheless, the ability of a program of
this type to reach the stated target should not be taken for granted. For instance, Battiloro
and Costabella (2011) evaluate a subsidy of around 4,500 euros for conversions, which
was introduced in 2007 in the Province of Turin in Italy. By comparing the time series in
Turin with those from other unaffected provinces, they find no evidence of an increase in
the number of conversions.
In this paper we contribute to the literature by analyzing results relative to an Italian
scheme, based on a December 5, 2012 decree, that subsidized conversions from fixed-
term to open-end contracts. The policy did not apply to all groups of workers as it ex-
cluded men over 30. Furthermore, the funds were limited; as a matter of fact, they
were exhausted in a couple of weeks. We elaborate on these features of the scheme and
evaluate its effects through a diff-in-diffs strategy, which compares eligible workers with
their non-eligible counterparts (older males) over very short periods of time. This strat-
egy allows us to estimate the intention to treat effect (ITT) of the policy, which cap-
tures how the change in incentives altered the rate of conversion for eligible contracts
during the period in which the subsidy was available.
Using aggregate time series from the Veneto region, Anastasia et al. (2013) showed
that for the eligible groups the total number of conversions approximately doubled over
the period of validity of the policy with respect to the previous year, and that there was
a significant difference between the totals for men aged 29 and men aged 30. Differ-
ently from them, we directly use the microdata built from the administrative archives
of the same region, a dataset that allows us to track individual fixed-term contracts
over time. We focus on how their probability of conversion changed over different pe-
riods within 2012. In particular, we distinguish between periods with different exposure
to the effects of the scheme (pre-announcement, announcement, treatment, end of
funds). Apart from allowing us to focus on conversion rates rather than the time series
of conversions, the use of microdata enables us to provide a deeper investigation of
substitution effects and heterogeneity. We conduct an extensive series of robustness
checks, and we also analyze whether transformation rates of men aged 30 or more de-
creased in firms where there were eligible colleagues. Furthermore, we study the effect
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months after the end of the scheme. Finally, we also discuss the heterogeneity of the ef-
fects by educational status and by number of fixed-term employees within the firm.
Our estimates suggest that the policy increased the probability of transformation by
83% with respect to the counterfactual rate of conversion, with larger effects for men
under 30 and women over 30 and a smaller impact on younger women. There is no
evidence that entrepreneurs postponed conversions during the short period between the
announcement and the full implementation of the program or that they reduced the
conversion rate after the funds were terminated; we also fail to find evidence that the im-
pact is due to substitution between eligible and non-eligible workers. These results are ro-
bust to several checks, including a falsification exercise aimed at detecting infra-annual
confounding trends. We finally show that the effect seems to have lasted for 7.5 months
after the end of the policy, which is the time extension of the last available data at the
moment of writing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the policy. Section 3 presents
the data, while Section 4 describes the identification strategy. Section 5 discusses the
results. Section 6 compares the scheme with the previous policy introduced in Italy in
2001 to tentatively draw some conclusions for program design. Section 7 concludes.
2 The program
The 5 October 2012 Decree introduced financial incentives for employers who:
 converted ongoing fixed-term contracts for eligible workers into permanent ones;
the incentive in this case was equal to 12,000 euros per conversion;
 stabilized workers with ongoing non-standard contracts (parasubordinati) or who
had concluded a fixed-term or non-standard temporary contract in the previous
6 months and had been unemployed thereafter; similarly, this incentive amounted to
12,000 euros per stabilization;
 hired workers with a fixed-time contract, but only if this hire increased the total
workforce of the firm. In this case, the benefit was between 3,000 and 6,000 euros
depending on the length of the contract.
The scheme required that the job last for at least 6 months after the conversion/hire.3
To comply with this requirement, the actual incentives were distributed only after this
period of time. Eligible workers were men under 30 and women of any age. In the case
of permanent contracts on a part-time basis, the amount of the subsidy was propor-
tionally reduced. Moreover, each employer could request at most 10 incentives.
The Decree made use of a dedicated national fund for the purpose of increasing em-
ployment of young people and women. The fund was set up by Law 201/2011 (December
2011), but details on how the money was to be used were not fully defined until 5 October
2012 when the Decree introducing the program was approved by the Ministry of Labor
and Social Policies jointly with the Ministry of Economics and Finance. We therefore take
the latter as the date of announcement of the program. Figure 1 depicts the timeline of
the policy.
The incentive applied only to conversions/stabilizations/hires made after the official
date of publication of the Decree: the 17th of October. The program was supposed to
Figure 1 Timeline of the policy.
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firms should have already signed (and communicated to the competent administra-
tion) the new contract with the eligible worker. Importantly, they could not make the
contract conditional on the actual receipt of the incentive. Given that the funds were
limited, employers could check online before making an application to see whether
the number of requests made until then had already used up the total budget. How-
ever, if the funds terminated on the day of application, requests would be funded on a
first-come-first-served basis, and those who turned out to be excluded could not can-
cel the conversion. On the 2nd of November, the National Institute for Social Security
(INPS) announced that the number of requests received until then would terminate
the funds, and therefore the agency discouraged new applications. Some requests ar-
rived after the 2nd of November. This happened because it was not clear if all the ap-
plications already presented were actually eligible. Therefore, some employers might
have applied, notwithstanding the INPS warning, hoping that they could still receive
funding.
The only publicly available data on the program came from the Ministry of Labor
website: at the national level, between 17/10/2012 and 31/03/2013, 44,054 requests
were made, of which only 24,581 were accepted (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche
Sociali 2013). As to the acceptances, the firms were notified of acceptance only in June
2013 so as to comply with the requirement that the job had lasted at least 6 months.
Given that the rules of the game were relatively simple, selection was mostly based on
the order of presentation rather than on eligibility.
From the information released by the Ministry of Labor, we know that around 90% of
all incentives were distributed for conversions or stabilizations of temporary contracts.
Considering that the incentive for direct hires with fixed-term contracts was less gener-
ous (and required an increase in the overall workforce), it is not surprising that few re-
quests were made for that option. Compared to fixed-term workers, the number of
parasubordinati is much smaller; moreover, this group is highly heterogeneous as
regards the features of the firm-employee relationship. For these reasons, in this paper
we focus only on the conversions of ongoing fixed-term contracts, which could be
subsidized if made between the 17th of November until the end of funds (2nd of
November). We do not consider the case of those who had concluded a temporary
contract within 6 months and had been unemployed thereafter. The main issue is that
these individuals may also migrate to/from other regions, and therefore we cannot al-
ways track whether they become stabilized or not. Nevertheless, in the robustness sec-
tion, we show that there is no evidence of change in the number of direct hires during
the validity of the incentives.
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Since March 2008 employers who hire new workers or modify pre-existing contracts
are obliged to communicate such information to a regional agency through an online
system called sistema di comunicazione obbligatoria (Anastasia et al. 2009, 2010). This
administrative archive does not provide a complete stock of workers. Permanent and
temporary contracts signed before March 2008 and that did not experience any modifi-
cation (for instance a switch from full to part time or an extension in the case of tem-
porary contracts) are not entered in the sistema di comunicazione obbligatoria dataset.
However, this is not a problem if we want to focus on the stock of ongoing fixed-term
contracts in the most recent years. The reason is that standard fixed-term contracts
can be signed only for up to 36 months, and therefore their entire stock should be ob-
servable in the files starting from March 2011.4
The quality of these data depends not only on the accuracy of the employers but also
on the skills of the regional agencies in charge of maintaining and validating the ar-
chives. In Italy, the region with the longest tradition in analyzing these data is Veneto
(Maurizio 2006), where the local agency (Veneto Lavoro) started developing a dedicated
software in 1996. Moreover, using the flow of communications, the agency organizes a
full set of longitudinal microdata that track single individuals through time. Veneto
Lavoro makes available to researchers the entire universe of microdata, while at the na-
tional level, these data are available only for a subset of workers (individuals born on 48
different dates) and, crucially, without any information about contract conversions. The
Veneto region is one of the most important economic areas of the country: according
to the Labor Force Survey, in 2012 Veneto accounted for 9.5% of total employees in
Italy and for 8.3% of total employees on temporary contracts.
We focus on the (regional) universe of job relationships that started with a standard
fixed-term contract (tempo determinato) at any time and that were still active as fixed-
term contracts for at least one day during some specific periods of 2012 (defined in the
next section). These relationships might either keep their short-term nature or be con-
verted into permanent positions. We analyze the extent to which there has been a
change in the event “fixed contract converted into permanent” because of the program.
We select only standard fixed-term contracts; that is, we exclude contracts that are ac-
tivated to substitute a permanent worker on leave (per sostituzione), those signed
with a temporary employment agency (interinale o a scopo di somministrazione),
those allowing the employee to work at home (a domicilio), and those designed for par-
ticular sectors or for other particular reasons.5 We make very minor corrections on the
raw data, dropping a few cases where we observed a change in the nature of the contract
for no precise reason and correcting the date of conversion for some job-relationships
where the conversion episode was repeated more than once. We also exclude very few
cases (around 0.6% of those job-relationships that were subject to conversions) where the
standard fixed-term contract was converted into a non-standard permanent contract be-
cause these may signal measurement error.
Using the longitudinal information on each job relationship i = 1,…,N, we build a
panel over four different periods t = 1,…,4 in 2012. The length of each period is be-
tween 12 and 16 days (the next section explains the details on these units of time). For
each period, we keep only job-relationships that are active as fixed-term contracts; that
is, fixed term contracts with at least one day of duration during the period. The panel
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year; therefore, new job relationships can enter the panel in any period; b) fixed-term
contracts terminate (either for the natural end of the contract or for other reasons) or
are converted into permanent ones; these contracts exit the panel in the period after
that in which the event takes place.
Our main outcome is a binary variable:
yit ¼ 1 job− relationship i is converted from temporary to permanent in period t½ 
ð1Þ
so that our results have to be interpreted as the impact of the scheme on the prob-ability that a temporary contract active during a single period t is converted into
permanent during the period. The zero outcome includes different kinds of situa-
tions: contracts that continue as temporary in the same firms, contracts of workers
who quit and then become unemployed, and contracts of workers who quit and then
become employed. The interpretation of the main results is therefore how the policy
affects the probability of experiencing a conversion versus any other outcome. The
main concern for the evaluation of the policy is that the zeros may include individ-
uals who leave a fixed-term contract and sign a permanent contract with another
employer. In Section 5.4 we also present results on the probability of being in per-
manent employment (with any employer) some months after the end of the funds.
Given that periods are of different length, one may find it difficult to interpret the
results. To address this concern, in Section 5.1 we also calculate the effect as a pro-
portion of the counterfactual and as total number of conversions. Furthermore, in
Section 5.2 we discuss a model where the unit of measurement is the daily probabi-
lity of conversion.
For each job-relationship we observe some time invariant characteristics: educational
level of the worker, gender, sector of activity, and citizenship.6 We also know two im-
portant time variant observables: the worker’s age at the start of each period and the
job-relationship elapsed duration at the end of the period.7 Finally, we can identify the
employer: this allows us to cluster the standard errors at the firm level and observe
how many fixed-term contracts refer to the same firm at a particular moment in time.
From the panel, we drop those observations where age or gender are missing (21 in
total), and we select only individuals aged between 16 and 65, mainly in order to avoid
extreme cases that are likely to signal measurement error. We end up with 593,028 ob-
servations, approximately 148,000 job relationships per period.
4 Identification strategy
We use a diff-in-diffs strategy over different periods within 2012 and different groups
in terms of program eligibility, defined on the basis of demographic characteristics. We
focus on the impact the policy has on the eligible groups’ conversion rates so that our
estimates can be interpreted as the Intention To Treat (ITT). This effect is of interest
for a policy maker who wants to understand whether the change in incentives designed
by the policy had any impact on the likelihood that eligible contracts experienced a
conversion. Although our data do not contain information as to who actually received
the incentive, it should be noticed that we only need eligibility to estimate the ITT.
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cator for the actual treatment status are required. Nevertheless, in Section 5 we also
calculate the actual cost for each increased unit of conversion in a scenario in which all
transformations for the eligible groups are incentivized.8
Following the standard model (Angrist and Pischke 2009), we assume that the ex-
pected potential outcome when not treated (indexed by 0) depends additively on the
group g and on the period t:
E½y0igt g; tj  ¼ μg þ λt ; ð2Þ
which implies two basic assumptions (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999):
A1.The time trend is parallel across groups.
A2.The group effect does not change over time; that is, the group composition is (on
average) constant.
Secondly, we assume that the effect of the policy is additive so that the potential out-
come when treated (indexed by 1) is simply
E½y1igt g; tj  ¼ E½y0igt g; tj  þ δ ¼ μg þ λt þ δ: ð3Þ
Exploiting the timeline of the policy (see Figure 1), we define 4 periods of interest: Period I: [19/09 - 4/10]; that is, 16 days before the announcement.
 Period II: [5/10 - 16/10]; that is, the 12 days between announcement and the actual
start of the program.
 Period III: [17/10 - 01/11]; that is, the 16 days when the incentives were fully
available.
 Period IV: [02/11 - 17/11]; that is, the 16 days after INPS declared that funds were
(presumably) already used up.
We assume that in Period I the policy will not have any effect: only on the 5th of
October was the scheme of incentives made public, receiving full attention from the
media. Consequently, most of the activity will take place in Period III, given that em-
ployers will already have had enough time to acquire the information. However, the ef-
fect of the policy may not be limited to changes during that period if employers have
substituted conversions over time in order to benefit from the incentives.9 To start
with, if they were already fully informed during Period II, they may have postponed
some conversions in order to wait for the scheme to be in place. Moreover, the fact that
funds were limited clearly might have given them a strong incentive to anticipate
Period III conversions that would have taken place, without the scheme, much later in
time. This is the reason why we also analyze the days after the shortage of funding
(Period IV). In both cases (periods II and IV), we expect that if employers have
substituted conversions over time in order to benefit from the incentives, the effect of
the policy should compensate those observed in Period III. The lengths of Periods I and
IV were chosen in order to match the period of full validity of the incentives.
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eligible, while younger men and women of any age were. We allocate individuals to
each group according to their age at the beginning of the period.10
In order to identify the effect δ, we exploit the structure of entitlement envisaged by
the policy. Given that men over 30 were not eligible, we use these workers as a control
group to estimate the trend over periods of time and then use it to clear the time ef-
fects for other groups as well, thanks to assumption A1. Once we are able to identify
λt, we also need to clear out the group effect. In this case, we exploit the period before
the announcement (Period I). If, as we argued, the policy could not have any effect at
that time, then during that period we observe only y0 for everyone; therefore, we
can use it to identify the differences across groups. Finally, for the eligible workers in
the post-announcement periods (II-III-IV), we observe only the outcome when treated
(y1), and therefore we can remove from it the time and group components to get the
policy effect δ.
Our results are derived from a specification where the treatment effect δ varies by
period of treatment (II-III-IV) and across eligible groups. This is equivalent to a series
of 2X2 diff-in-diffs estimates, where the control group is always men over 30, and the
pre-reform period is always Period I. For each single group (men under 30, women
under 30 and women aged 30+), or for all the eligible groups altogether, the effects of
interest can be identified from the coefficients on the interaction terms:
yit ¼ β0 þ βE1 Eligible½ it þ βII1 Period II½ it þ βIII1 Period III½ it þ βIV1 Period IV½ it þ
þ δII1 Eligible½ it  1 PII½ it þ δIII1 Eligible½ it  1 PIII½ it þ δIV1 Eligible½ it  1 PIV½ it þ εit
ð4Þ
For δ to identify a causal effect, we need to assume that the policy was an exogenous
shock so that the treated groups were not endogenously chosen among those that
would have experienced an increase in conversion rates anyway. This potential threat
seems to be hardly realistic: eligibility was targeted on workers who were more likely to
be hit by the on-going economic crisis. Furthermore, our estimates are based on rela-
tively short periods of time, ordered in succession. Hence, it is difficult to imagine that,
in the absence of the policy, the conversion rate would change abruptly only during the
16 days in which incentives were fully available.
The presence of a control group and the comparison with non-treated periods should
clear out unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of the effect of the policy on the
rate of conversion during Period III (the ITT discussed above), as long as we do not
find evidence of other forms of substitution over time or across different kinds of
workers. Clearly, this is not sufficient to draw conclusions about the longer term effects
on other outcomes (for instance, labor productivity) of additional conversions induced
by the policy. This would require new data and a different strategy comparing subsi-
dized conversions with those that did not receive any incentive; therefore, we defer that
matter to future research projects. One important critique is that, even in the short
term, employers may have made conversions only in order to access the benefits and
later dismiss the worker after the six months required by the decree. The stronger EPL
associated with permanent contracts should reduce the likelihood of this strategic be-
havior, but it should be taken into account that the legislation is weak in smaller firms.
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probability of being permanently employed some months later, and we show that per-
manent employment lasted up to 7.5 months after the end of Period III (that is, until
the most recent data available at the time of writing).
There are other threats to identification. First of all, there may be seasonal trends that
diverge across groups. Since we estimate the effect of the scheme for very short periods
of time during Fall 2012, group-specific seasonality might unduly confound identifica-
tion. In the empirical section below, we check whether this is the case by running a fal-
sification test using 2011 calendar periods analogous to the ones we focus on for the
year 2012.
Secondly, the panel is unbalanced. This implies that group composition is not guar-
anteed to be stable over time. To lessen this concern, we run the same regressions but
add a large set of covariates (educational level, sector of activity, citizenship, age at the
beginning of the period, elapsed duration of the job-relationship at the end of the
period), which should differentiate our overtime variations in group compositions.
Thirdly, we need to assume that in Period I, employers were not aware of the policy,
or at least that the information available was not enough for them to already change
their decisions in order to later benefit from the incentives. To test this assumption, we
run a diff-in-diffs regression that compares the different groups between Period I in
2012 and the analogous period in 2011.
Last but not least, apart from substitution over time, which we directly addressed by
looking at periods II and IV, there may be other reactions that counteracted the effect-
iveness of the scheme. The most likely is that the incentives could have induced
employers to favor workers from eligible demographic groups and thus reduce conver-
sions for the non-eligible (men over 30). We provide evidence regarding this potential
channel of substitution by looking at the change in the conversion rate for non-eligible
workers during the same periods in 2012 and the previous year. Furthermore, as a con-
sequence of the policy, employers could have indirectly subsidized direct hires with
permanent contracts by hiring workers with fixed-term contracts and converting them
after a few days. Similarly, they could have favored conversions with respect to direct
hires. We also show what happens during the periods of validity, and relatively to 2011,
to the number of jobs starting with permanent contracts.
5 Results
5.1 Main results
Figure 2 shows the rate of conversion for each of the four periods across groups in
2012. Before the announcement (Period I), the rates of conversion are similar for all
groups, with only a slightly smaller probability for older women. In Period III the prob-
ability that a fixed-term contract will become permanent substantially increases for all
the eligible groups compared to the non-eligible one. The jump is larger for younger
men. The figure also shows no sign of substitution effects over time: in Period II and
Period IV the rates remain quite similar across the groups.
The diff-in-diffs regressions (Table 1) confirm the findings.11 Focusing on the entire
group of eligible workers, Column (1), there is no evidence of an anticipation effect
during the days between the announcement and the actual date of validity (Period II):
although there is a decrease in the overall conversion rate, this does not diverge
Figure 2 Conversion rate in 2012; Probability of conversion from fixed-term to permanent contracts
during the period, by period and group, year 2012.
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scheme when the program was about to start; therefore, substantial arbitrage across
periods was precluded. Consequently, there is a significant increase in the conversion
rate by 1.3 percentage points during the 16 days in which incentives were available and
fully funded (Period III).Table 1 Main results (probability of conversion from fixed-term to permanent contracts
during each single period in 2012)




All eligibles Men < 30 Women < 30 Women ≥ 30
Eligible −0.0021*** −0.0003 −0.0011 −0.0034***
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009)
Period II −0.0123*** −0.0123*** −0.0123*** −0.0123***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Period III 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Period IV −0.0099*** −0.0099*** −0.0099*** −0.0099***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Eligible × Period II 0.0011 0.0004 0.0000 0.0020**
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Eligible × Period III 0.0130*** 0.0162*** 0.0107*** 0.0124***
(0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0014)
Eligible × Period IV 0.0020** 0.0010 0.0014 0.0027***
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0010)
Constant 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 0.0177***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Observations 593,028 324,463 304,880 423,177
Note: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01. Standard errors clustered for employer in brackets. Estimates are obtained using Stata™ 13.
See Figure 1 for the definition of periods.
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the day on which INPS announced that applications were already sufficient to exhaust
funds. One possible explanation is that some employers might have realized that the
funds were (probably) terminated only after having signed a permanent contract with a
fixed-term worker; alternatively, they might have converted on purpose after the 2nd
November, in the expectation that some public money was left for them to receive (see
Section 2).
Columns (2)-(4) document the results for each single group of eligible employees.
For workers under 30, there is evidence of a positive effect of the policy in Period III.
The impact is greater for men, less for women. As for the other two periods, there is
no statistically significant change with respect to the control group. For older women
we still find a positive effect of the policy in Period III. However, there is also evidence
of a positive effect in Periods II and IV; the magnitude is around 0.2-0.3 percentage
points. These findings might suggest a diverging trend for this specific group, which
would infringe upon assumption A1 rather than being an actual policy effect. In par-
ticular, while the impact in Period IV can be rationalized on the basis of the scattered
timing of the actual end of the scheme, the effect in Period II is puzzling. If nothing,
we would have expected a decrease in the conversion rate for eligible workers in the
time window between announcement and beginning of validity. To take a cautious
stance, we might be overestimating the effect of the program for this specific group.
The overestimation should not be a great concern if we interpolate the observed diver-
ging trend, the bias would be around 0.2-0.3 percentage points, bringing the effect for
women, aged at least 30, closer to that for younger ones.
Table 2 provides some back-of-the-envelope calculations. Given that we do not know
who actually received the incentives, we assume that all eligible conversions in Period
III were subsidized.12 This gives an upward estimate for the actual cost because some
conversions may have been excluded from the incentives as a consequence of the short-
age of funding. However, this calculation is still of interest as it shows the effectiveness
of the program in a normal situation where all eligible conversions receive a subsidy.
First, we compute the proportional increase in conversions due to the program as the
ratio between the estimated effect in Period III and the counterfactual conversion rate
predicted by the model.13 As a share of the counterfactual conversions predicted inTable 2 Summary of the effects
All eligibles Men < 30 Women < 30 Women ≥ 30
Counterfactual conversion rate from fixed-term to
permanent during period III
0.0157 0.0175 0.0167 0.0145
Policy effect in period III 0.0130 0.0162 0.0107 0.0124
Counterfactual number of conversions during period III 1,395 402 307 684
Policy effect in number of conversions during period III 1,156 372 197 589
Policy effect/counterfactual rate 83% 92% 64% 86%
% full time on total conversions in period III 62% 84% 56% 50%
Average incentive (euro) 9,693 11,047 9,345 9,007
Full cost per increased conversion (euro) 21,392 23,008 23,889 19,472
Note: the number of conversions is calculated as the estimated probability times the number of fixed-term contracts
active in Period III. The second column does not precisely sum up the following three because the estimate of the effect
comes from the aggregate model (Table 1, col. (1)). The average cost of a conversion is calculated assuming that all
part-time are at half time.
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women, and 64% for females under 30. The average effect for all the eligible groups is
calculated to be 83%. This latter figure implies that in order to increase the number of
conversions by one unit, the government has also financed 1.2 conversions that would
have taken place even in the absence of the program. Given that our data refer to the
universe of all fixed-term contracts (started with a standard type) for workers aged 15–
65 in Veneto, we can also compute the effect of the scheme in terms of number of con-
tracts by multiplying the number of observations for the estimated probabilities.
Among 2,551 conversions observed in Veneto in Period III, 1,156 of them are attribut-
able to the program. Moreover, using the information on whether the converted con-
tract is full or part time, we are also able to estimate the average incentive and the
average cost per increased conversion. As reported in Table 2, on average, 62% of the
job-relationships subject to conversion in Period III were full-time. Assuming that all
the part-times were at half of the standard working time, the average incentive was
9,693 euros.14 This implies that the full cost of an actual unit increase in the number of
conversions with respect to the counterfactual conversion is 21,392 euros, as it requires
an expenditure of 11,700 euros for other transformations that would have taken place
even in the absence of the policy.
One important critique to this calculation is that, due to the short duration of the
policy, the effect observed during Period III comes mainly from the most informed
firms and from those employers who are more reactive to these kinds of incentives. On
the one hand, this would induce a bias in our estimates only if this additional effect is
simply due to a strategic substitution of conversion over time or between eligible and
non-eligible workers. In the next subsection, we propose a full set of robustness checks
to argue that this was not the case, at least overall. On the other hand, this self-
selection may imply that all of the potential demand for incentives related to actual
additional conversions was already exhausted by the available funds. We cannot there-
fore say whether additional funding and a longer extension of the program would have
increased the effect.
5.2 Robustness checks
Given that our periods are different, both in terms of months and calendar position
within the month, the conversion rate across time might be affected by seasonal pat-
terns. In our case, seasonality would bias the results only as long as there are group-
specific seasonal trends. To check whether this problem affects our estimates, we also
replicate the same exercise of Table 1 over the analogous periods in year 2011 when
the scheme was not in place (and no similar policy was implemented).15 That is, we
run a falsification experiment. From Figure 3, which mirrors Figure 2 but refers to
2011, we notice no evidence of diverging trends. The comparison with the previous
year also shows that the reduced overall conversion rate in Periods II and IV is not due
to substitution over time, that is, to employers who postponed or anticipated to Period
III conversions of contracts for any type of worker in order to benefit from the incen-
tives. On the contrary, the reduction is due to the fact that the two periods do not
include either the beginning or end of the month, when conversions usually take place,
and to the shorter length of Period II. This seasonality, which does not differ across
groups, was present in 2011 as well, with rates very similar to 2012.
Figure 3 Conversion rate in 2011; Probability of conversion from fixed-term to permanent contracts
during the period, by period and group, year 2011.
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a slight (boundary statistically significant at the 10% level; p-value 0.095) drop in Period
III for the groups of interest, which would either imply that our results underestimate
the true effect (if the drop had been there even in the absence of the policy) or that dif-
ferential (by groups and periods) shocks to conversion rates materialized. However, theTable 3 Falsification (probability of conversion from fixed-term to permanent contracts
during each single period in 2011)
Control group: Men ≥ 30 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: dummy for conversion All eligibles Men < 30 Women < 30 Women ≥ 30
Eligible −0.0018** −0.0012 −0.0020 −0.0021**
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Period II −0.0121*** −0.0121*** −0.0121*** −0.0121***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Period III −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Period IV −0.0097*** −0.0097*** −0.0097*** −0.0097***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Eligible × Period II −0.0004 −0.0008 −0.0006 −0.0002
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0010)
Eligible × Period III −0.0018* −0.0009 −0.0016 −0.0024*
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Eligible × Period IV −0.0012 −0.0017 −0.0013 −0.0008
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Constant 0.0184*** 0.0184*** 0.0184*** 0.0184***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Observations 614,895 340,214 313,218 438,457
Note: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01. Standard errors clustered for employer in brackets. See Figure 1 for the definition
of periods.
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estimated for the same period in 2012, when the policy was effective. If we look at re-
sults for the different eligible groups (columns (2)-(4) in Table 3), the slight drop in
Period III seems to be driven only by older women (again the coefficient is significant
only at the 10% level). Notice also that the size of this drop, 0.2 percentage points,
would broadly compensate the previously discussed positive bias for this specific demo-
graphic group.16
Given that the panel is unbalanced, the group composition is not guaranteed to be
stable over time.17 In order to see whether large changes in the group composition are
affecting the results, in Table 4, column (1), we also add to the basic regression (that of
Table 1, Column 1) some relevant covariates: dummies for sector of activity (NACE Rev.
2 sections, composed of 21 categories), dummies for educational level, a dummy for
Italian citizenship, age at the beginning of the period, and job-relationship elapsed
duration at the end of the period.18 The results are basically unchanged. Therefore, time
variation in group composition seems not to be driving our findings. Column (2) provides
the results we obtain by adding the covariates to the falsification experiment. The bizarre
effect found previously in Period III is no longer statistically significant.Table 4 Robustness checks (probability of conversion from fixed-term to permanent
contract during each single period)
Control group:
Men ≥ 30
























Eligible −0.0017** −0.0008 −0.0004 −0.0023 −0.0021***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0007)
Period II −0.0129*** −0.0126*** −0.0140*** −0.0156*** −0.0121***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0008)
Period III −0.0009 −0.0012 −0.0008 −0.0012 0.0022**
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0010)
Period IV −0.0117*** −0.0112*** −0.0105*** −0.0134*** −0.0085***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0008)
Eligible × Period II 0.0014* −0.0003 0.0002 0.0023 0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0008)
Eligible × Period III 0.0134*** −0.0017 0.0153*** 0.0003 0.0147***
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0013)
Eligible × Period IV 0.0026*** −0.0008 0.0000 0.0009 0.0014
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0010)
Constant 0.0063*** 0.0069*** 0.0193*** 0.0210*** 0.0177***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0007)
Observations 593,028 614,891 145,803 156,147 539,923
Note: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01. Standard errors clustered for employer in brackets. See Figure 1 for the definition of periods.
Covariates in columns (1)-(2) include dummies for sector of economic activity (NACE Rev. 2 sections), dummies for educational
level, a dummy for Italian citizenship, age at the beginning of the period, and elapsed duration of the job-relationship at the end
of the period. Missing values for the sector of activity have been excluded (only 4 observations in 2011), while missing values for
educational level have been kept but adding a specific dummy. Coefficients are available on request.
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in terms of average age. Column (3) shows that our results are robust to selecting only
individuals around the age cut-off. For this experiment, we make use of the interval
[26,34). The estimated effect is larger in percentage points but quite close to the base-
line results if measured as a proportion of the counterfactual conversion rate. Similar
results are obtained by choosing only individuals aged between 29 and 30. Furthermore,
we also checked whether the effect is there by focusing on men only and running the
dif-in-dif regressions by progressively shrinking the age range around 30 in order to
approach a regression discontinuity design. Results are in line with those presented in
the text. See Additional file 1 for the estimate table.
The effect in the age-restricted sample may actually highlight a possible substitution
issue. While workers of different age groups may be imperfect substitutes, the degree
of substitutability may be quite strong between men aged [26,30) and those aged
[30,34). We replicated the main regression for men from Table 1 by dropping those
aged [30,35). Results are basically unchanged (see Additional file 1).19
We assumed that firms did not anticipate the policy during Period I so that we could
use it to consistently estimate the group effects. This is not necessarily true if firms
were already aware of how the government would use the fund established by Law
201/2011, which passed in December 2011. To test whether this was the case, we esti-
mate a diff-in-diffs regression with the same control/treatment groups but consider
only two periods: Period I in 2012 and Period I in 2011. If eligible groups were affected
by the scheme already in Period I of 2012, then we should find evidence of an effect
when comparing it with the analogous period in 2011 (using men over 30 as a control).
We estimate the following specification:
yit ¼ γ0 þ γE1 Eligible½ it þ γ20121 year 2012½ it þ δI1 Eligible½ it  1 year 2012½ it þ ηit
ð5Þ
We find that the coefficient on the interaction is not statistically (or economically)significant, given that it is 0.03 percentage points. A similar result is obtained by disag-
gregating different groups, as in Table 1, Columns (2)-(4). Therefore, there seems to be
no evidence that firms anticipated the implementation of the program before its an-
nouncement. Similar diff-in-diffs results between Period III in 2012 and the analogous
period in 2011 confirm the presence of an effect, although estimates are somewhat lar-
ger (around 1.8 percentage points for men under 30 and 1.3 for both groups of
women).
Besides anticipation and/or delay effects, which refer to the eligible groups, employers
could have also substituted conversions for the control group in favor of those for eli-
gible workers. If this happened, we would expect to find the trend over the four periods
for the control group to show a dip in Period III. Given that a similar dip could have
been present also in 2011, we tested whether the trend over periods I to IV was differ-
ent in 2012 with respect to 2011. Results are reported in Table 5, column (1). A test for
interactions between the dummy for 2012 and the dummies for periods II-III-IV being
jointly equal to zero failed to reject the null, with a p-value of 0.9381. Therefore, the evi-
dence is not contrary to the assumption that the control group has not been affected (on
average) by the policy. Clearly, substitution is more likely to occur in those firms where
men over 30 have other colleagues on fixed-term contracts who are eligible for the
Table 5 Test for a reduction in the control group: change in conversion rate trends
across periods, 2012 vs 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: dummy
for conversion
Men ≥ 30 Men ≥ 30 with no
eligible colleagues
Men ≥ 30 with
eligible colleagues
Men ≥ 30 with one
eligible colleague
Period II (in 2011) −0.0121*** −0.0162*** −0.0104*** −0.0160***
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0033)
Period III (in 2011) −0.0003 −0.0027 0.0005 −0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0041)
Period IV (in 2011) −0.0097*** −0.0137*** −0.0081*** −0.0131***
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0034)
Year 2012 −0.0007 −0.0014 −0.0004 −0.0021
(0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0040)
Year 2012 × Period II −0.0002 0.0010 −0.0009 0.0003
(0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0046)
Year 2012 × Period III 0.0004 0.0002 0.0006 0.0029
(0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0058)
Year 2012 × Period IV −0.0002 −0.0007 0.0002 0.0027
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0049)
Constant 0.0184*** 0.0258*** 0.0150*** 0.0237***
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0029)
Observations 468,243 160,025 308,218 21,459
Note: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01. Standard errors clustered for employer in brackets. In period IV those who had an
eligible colleague during period III (of the same year) are considered as having an eligible colleague as well.
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further limited to the cases where there is only one eligible colleague.20 The change in
the across period pattern is still very close to zero and statistically not significant. For
completeness, Table 6 shows some closely related placebo regressions: we still focus only
on individuals aged 30 or more, but we define as “treated” those with an eligible col-
league. We focus on single periods, and we use 2011 as pre-policy and 2012 as after-
policy. Again, all interactions are precisely estimated zeros.21Table 6 Test for a reduction in the control group: change in conversion rate between
2011 and 2012, only men ≥ 30 with eligible colleagues
Dep. var.: dummy for conversion Men ≥ 30
Period I Period II Period III Period IV
Year 2012 −0.0014 −0.0004 −0.0013 −0.0021*
(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0011)
1[with eligible colleagues] −0.0108*** −0.0050*** −0.0075*** −0.0052***
(0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0010)
Year 2012 × 1[with eligible colleagues] 0.0010 −0.0009 0.0015 0.0019
(0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0014)
Constant 0.0258*** 0.0096*** 0.0230*** 0.0121***
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0008)
Observations 131,050 116,164 115,086 105,943
Note: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01. Standard errors clustered for employer in brackets. In period IV those who had an
eligible colleague during Period III (of the same year) are considered as having an eligible colleague as well.
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to permanent positions) and direct hires with a permanent contract. In Figure 4 we
show the time series of the daily difference between the number of direct hires with a
permanent contract in 2012 and in 2011, for different groups. There is no evidence of a
change in the number of direct hires during the period of validity of the policy.
A related concern is that firms could have simply hired individuals under fixed-term
contracts during Periods II or III and converted them shortly after in order to benefit
from the incentives. However, only 3.8% of the converted contracts for eligible individ-
uals in Period III had lasted less than a month at the time of conversion. Furthermore,
if this had been the case, all the effects should have come from job-relationships
started after the announcement of the policy. We reproduced our main regressions by
keeping a “closed” sample composed only of fixed-term contracts started in Period IFigure 4 Number of direct hires in 2012 vs 2011; Difference in the number of direct hires with
permanent contracts between 2012 and 2011, by day and group.
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discussed.
Incentives for converting a contract may be substantially different depending on the
duration of the job-relationship. Although the estimates with covariates already include
the elapsed duration in days as a control, an alternative would be to specify a duration
model. Given that our smallest time unit is the day, we rearrange our panel into job-
relationship – day observations, and we focus on the daily probability of conversion. In
each day, contracts that are still active as fixed-term have yit = 0 (here, the time sub-
script t refers to days), while those that get converted have yit = 1 and exit the sample
after the conversion. Essentially, we rearrange the sample as a typical case of stock sam-
pling for the estimation of a discrete-hazard model.
Using this sample, we first re-estimate the main linear dif-in-dif model (as in Table 1,
column (1)) on this new sample. Unsurprisingly, the results are very similar, with a sta-
tistically significant increase in the daily probability of conversion for the eligible group
of 0.09 percentage points during Period III, which is equal to 80.5 percent of the coun-
terfactual rate (see Additional file 1 for full results).
We then estimate a simple discrete-hazard model using a logit (common in the lit-
erature) but specifying the index as in the dif-in-dif specification plus the log of the
elapsed duration (in days) as an additional covariate. We also include a full set of inter-
actions between duration and the eligible period and the eligible × period interaction
dummies in order to allow for heterogeneity in the policy effect by duration.22 This is
important to also address the fact that with stock-sampling there is a potential problem
of under-representation of short-lasting job-relationships. Due to lack of space, graphs
showing the predicted daily rate of conversion by contract duration and the relative
counterfactual rate are reported in the Additional file 1. Results are in line with those
from our main regression: the conversion rate, in this case expressed on a daily basis,
increases for the eligible group with respect to the counterfactual rate in Period III,
while no statistically significant change is found in the other periods. The effect is
present for all durations. In absolute value, it is greater for older contracts, but overall
the change associated with the policy can be seen as a shift upward of the curve of daily
conversion rates with respect to elapsed duration. Similar results hold if we use dum-
mies for elapsed duration in quarters as a covariate instead of the log of elapsed dur-
ation in days.
Given that an effect is also found for relatively younger contracts, we worried that
the effects of anticipation on the conversion rates of eligible workers could be found
later than Period IV, which also does not include the beginning of a month. In extend-
ing the time period, there is a trade-off between the likelihood that the parallel trend
assumptions still hold and the possibility that substitution effects take place later in
time. We tried to balance the two by adding four subsequent periods of 16-days, hence
plugging in dates until January 21st. The results are reassuring (see Additional file 1).
Although the estimates for the interaction term with the last two periods is negative,
these are due to different seasonal trends as they are also present in the falsification
over 2011, with very similar magnitude and standard errors. Indeed, if we remove them
by running a triple-difference regression, there is no evidence of an additional effect of
the policy in any of the groups. Similar results hold with a “closed” sample of contracts
signed before the policy was announced. These results on the following period are also
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plained by the progressive selection of the best-performing firms during the ongoing
economic crisis. If this was true, we should find positive effects also in December 2012
and early January 2013.
Additional robustness tests have also been implemented. For instance, a possible dif-
ficulty is related with the circumstance that, for bureaucratic reasons, conversions are
more likely at the turn of a month. In our case, however, the effect is not driven by
conversions taking place at the end of October or beginning of November: excluding
the days [31/10-02/11], we still find evidence of an impact for the eligible group (see
Additional file 1). Finally, the incentives for conversions could be cumulated with
others available for hiring workers that have been previously dismissed through a particu-
lar procedure called mobilità. We also replicated all our regressions by excluding these
employees, again with no significant changes in the findings (see Additional file 1).
5.3 Heterogeneity
The results documented so far for the groups of eligible workers might mask relevant
heterogeneities. An important issue refers to the impact of the scheme across individ-
uals with different education. For instance, a policy maker might want to know whether
the program works for those who are less endowed with human capital, as their per-
formance in the labor market is usually more problematic. In the following, for simpli-
city, we only focus on the effects that materialize in Period III.
Figure 5 shows, for the eligible groups taken as a whole, the breakdown by educa-
tional level of the estimated effect (measured in percentage points on the left and as a
proportion of the counterfactual rate on the right).23 The impact of the scheme seems
to be less for those who have at most completed primary school. However, this is a
relatively small group, accounting for only 10.7% of the observations for eligible
workers in 2012. Differently, starting from middle school (8th grade), there is no evi-
dence of strong heterogeneity: most of the effects are positive, and there is no system-
atic increase associated with higher qualifications. Furthermore, the effects are allFigure 5 Dif-in-dif by educational level; Effect on the rate of conversion for the entire eligible
group during Period III, in absolute value on the left and as a proportion of the counterfactual rate
on the right; 95% confidence interval with s.e. clustered by employer; “Low” stands for workers
who completed at most primary school, “Middle” is the 8th grade, “Voc Dipl” is a vocational
diploma course that lasts two or three years after middle school, “High” is for high school, “Grad”
stands for university graduates.
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looking at the proportional effect, although it must be considered that these estimates
are less precise due to the fact that even the baseline rate of conversion is estimated
through the same model. The results obtained by breaking down the educational levels
for each single group (young men, young women, and older females) of eligible workers
are qualitatively similar (and available on request). One potential concern is that the re-
duction in the number of observations, and in particular in the total number of ob-
served conversions, for each cell of group × period × educational qualification makes
estimates largely imprecise, making it difficult to detect heterogeneity. To allay this
concern, we also estimated the average effects using only low qualifications (middle
school or less) on the one hand, and high qualifications (high school or above) on the
other.24 Results are only marginally modified: the 95% confidence interval for the effect
in percentage points is [.0098; .0161] for low qualifications, which is very similar to that
estimated for the other group, [.0089; .0163].25 Overall, it seems safe to conclude that
the impact of the scheme was quite homogeneous across groups with different
education.
It is also interesting to check to what extent the scheme impacted firms with different
compositions of their workforce in terms of contractual agreements. For instance,
because of the specific features of their production, some firms might be less interested
in signing permanent contracts no matter what incentives they could receive. On the
other hand, other firms might use short-term positions as a temporary step to bring
their workers into the permanent pool. In this latter case, at any point in time, the
firms will have many open-ended positions and only a few fixed-term appointments
(which will later expire or be converted). Figure 6 breaks down the impact of the pro-
gram by the number of fixed-term contracts referring to the same employer (again,
measured both in percentage points and as a proportion of the baseline rate of conver-
sion).26 The evidence suggests that the effect is less for workers whose employers hold
a larger number of fixed-term contracts.27 A statistical test on the equality of the effects
across the different categories of firms rejects the null at the 5% level, considering both
the effects in percentage points (p-value 0.000) and as a proportion of the baseline
(p-value 0.002). One important caveat is that the scheme has a limit of 10 incentivesFigure 6 Dif-in-dif by number of fixed-term contracts held by the employer; effect on the rate of
conversion for the entire eligible group during Period III, in absolute value on the left and as a
proportion of the counterfactual rate on the right; 95% confidence interval with s.e. clustered by
employer.
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workers with many colleagues holding fixed-term contracts.28
5.4 Effects on permanent employment
Finally, we double-check our findings by looking at the effects of the program on per-
manent employment measured up to 7.5 months after the end of Period III. The mag-
nitude of the financial incentives could have induced firms to convert short-term
positions into permanent contracts only to obtain the assignment and later dismiss the
workers as soon as the six-month duration requirement was met. Although the
possibility of this strategic behavior is limited by the presence of higher EPL for per-
manent workers, a fraction of subsidized conversions may have occurred in small enter-
prises, for which EPL is lower.29
Our test is the following. We switch our focus from job-relationships to individuals
and keep only those who held a standard fixed-term contract in Period III. Next, we
see whether, among this sample, those eligible for the incentives were more likely to be
in a permanent position (not necessarily with the same employers, as they may access
permanent employment also by applying to other employers) during the following
months; we use February, April and June 2013 (the last date of availability of our data).
We implement once more a diff-in-diffs approach and use as pre-policy counterfactuals
the individuals who held fixed-term contracts in the 2011 period analogous to Period
III, for which their employment status is measured during the first semester of 2012.
Formally, we estimate a diff-in-diffs regression of the type:
yit ¼ λ0 þ λE1 Eligible½ it þ λ20121 year 2012½ it þ θ 1 Eligible½ it  1 year 2012½ it þ μit
ð6Þ
Table 7 describes the results. In the first panel, Column (1) describes the estimates of
the probability of conversion during Period III. Columns (2), (3) and (4) provide the es-
timates of the chance of being in permanent employment in the following months. Our
evidence suggests a significant increase in the probability of conversion (at the individ-
ual level) in Period III (the magnitude of the effect is larger, but compatible with the re-
sults where the unit of observation is job-relationship). We also find positive and
statistically reliable effects as to the likelihood of being permanent in February, April
and June 2013. Note that the point estimates for the impact on permanent employment
later in time are smaller than the increase in conversion probability in Period III. Al-
though the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level only in one case (April),
this finding could mean that a fraction of the subsidized conversions went to individ-
uals who would have accessed permanent employment even in the absence of the
incentives.
However, we have to make sure that the eligible group does not show a diverging
trend in the probability of accessing permanent employment during the first semester
of 2013. In the second panel of Table 7, we run a falsification exercise by focusing on
individuals holding a fixed-term contract in the following month, between 17/11 and 2/
12. As we have already explained, in this period incentives were not available anymore.
According to our evidence of no substitution over time, we do not expect these individ-
uals to be affected by the policy. Indeed, column (1) of the second panel in Table 7
shows that there is no effect on the conversion rate of eligible individuals in this period.
Table 7 Regressions for the probability of being in permanent employment some months
later; individuals holding a fixed-term contract in a specific period
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control group: Men ≥ 30
Treatment group: all eligibles
Dummy for contract
conversion in the initial period
Dummy for permanent employment
on the 15th of the following:
February April June
Individuals with a fixed-term contract in period III (in 2011 or 2012)
Eligible −0.0037*** −0.0367*** −0.0420*** −0.0498***
(0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0037)
Year 2012 −0.0003 0.0036 0.0017 −0.0042
(0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Eligible × Year 2012 0.0152*** 0.0110*** 0.0078** 0.0089**
(0.0013) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0040)
Constant 0.0187*** 0.1701*** 0.2103*** 0.2425***
(0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0032)
Observations 284,012 284,012 284,012 284,012
Test for equality of interaction term with column (1) 0.2075 0.0428 0.1027
Falsification using period [17/11 - 2/12] (in 2011 or 2012)
Eligible −0.0040*** −0.0342*** −0.0402*** −0.0492***
(0.0008) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0038)
Year 2012 −0.0001 0.0092*** 0.0083** 0.0023
(0.0009) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Eligible × Year 2012 0.0003 −0.0056 −0.0091** −0.0078*
(0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0044)
Constant 0.0157*** 0.1609*** 0.2074*** 0.2460***
(0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0033)
Observations 244,950 244,950 244,950 244,950
Test for equality of interaction term with column (1) 0.1028 0.0199 0.0592
Triple difference
Eligible −0.0040*** −0.0342*** −0.0402*** −0.0492***
(0.0008) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0038)
Year 2012 −0.0001 0.0092*** 0.0083** 0.0023
(0.0009) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Eligible × Year 2012 0.0003 −0.0056 −0.0091** −0.0078*
(0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0044)
Period III 0.0030*** 0.0092*** 0.0029** −0.0035**
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Period III × Eligible 0.0003 −0.0025* −0.0018 −0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Period III × Year 2012 −0.0002 −0.0056*** −0.0067*** −0.0065***
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Period III × Eligible × Year 2012 0.0149*** 0.0166*** 0.0169*** 0.0166***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Constant 0.0157*** 0.1609*** 0.2074*** 0.2460***
(0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0033)
Observations 528,962 528,962 528,962 528,962
Test for equality of triple interaction term with col (1) 0.3105 0.2787 0.3631
Note: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01. Standard errors clustered for employer in brackets.
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diverging trend in the absence of the incentives. If there is evidence of a downward
trend (with respect to men over 30) in the probability of getting a permanent job, we
would be underestimating the effects of the incentives. In columns (2)-(4) of the second
panel, we find that the probability of being in permanent employment later in time (in
April and June) decreases by around 0.8-0.9 percentage points for eligible workers.
Note that this gap is similar to the difference between the effect on conversion and that
on permanent employment documented in the first panel.
Therefore, we find evidence of a diverging negative trend for the eligible group. In
order to correct it, the third panel runs a triple difference regression, which is simply
equivalent to subtracting panel 2 from panel 1. The effect of the policy is now captured
by the coefficient on the triple difference Period III × Eligible × Year 2012. The point es-
timates for employment are now quite stable over time and comparable with the con-
version rate, although slightly larger.
We also did an additional check. We replicated the second and third panel of Table 7
by removing from the group of individuals holding a fixed-term contract between 17/
11 and 2/12 those hired by firms that had previously had a conversion in Period III.
This should minimize the risk of substitution over time and across workers because it
excludes those employers who could have strategically anticipated conversions during
Period III. The results, available in the Additional file 1, are in line with those presented
here.
All in all, our findings suggest that the impact on permanent employment is still
there 7.5 months after the scheme has ended. More generally, this shows that the indi-
viduals who benefited from the increased conversion rate would not have found a per-
manent job in the absence of the policy. Nevertheless, part of the stability of the effect
over time may be due to the fact that the incentives were distributed only on condition
that the contract would last at least six months after the conversion.
6 Comparison with a previous Italian policy
A previous and related policy was introduced at the beginning of the last decade. A
comparison with it is useful to indicate which features may hinder or increase the ef-
fectiveness of these schemes.
In the year 2000, Law 388 established a tax-credit of 413 euros per month (620 in the
South of Italy) for each unit increase in the number of permanent workers aged 25 or
more with respect to the average reported for the pre-policy year. The scheme also re-
quired employers to increase the overall workforce. Essentially, employers could access
the incentive by hiring a new worker with a permanent contract or by converting a
fixed-term one but simultaneously also hiring a new temporary (or permanent)
worker.30 In both cases the new hire could not be simply a substitute for another em-
ployee ceasing his/her contract (due to retirement, dismissal, or for any other reason)
because the overall number of employees had to increase.31 The tax-credit was quite
extensive in time, as it was supposed to last until the end of 2003, and it was later ex-
tended until 31/12/2006 by law 289/2002. This policy was evaluated by Cipollone and
Guelfi (2003, 2006), who estimated its impact on the probability that individuals would
enter into permanent employment using longitudinal data from the Labor Force Sur-
vey. Although they found no aggregate effect, they provided evidence of a positive effect
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model where individual productivity is unknown to the employer, who therefore prefers
to hire permanently only individuals with a strong sign of higher productivity. They
also found that the effect of the incentives on the probability of getting a permanent
job was higher for those who were employed with a temporary training contract in the
previous year (not necessarily with the same employer) and for those who were un-
employed but had previous work experience.
Differently from them, we found an aggregate positive effect, and we did not find
sensible differences according to the educational level of the worker. One reason is that
the general results of Cipollone and Guelfi (2006) refer to the probability of entering
permanent employment from any other status, while we analyzed the effect only on the
conversion rates from fixed-term to open-ended contracts. Indeed, our results are
consistent with their finding of a positive effect for those previously employed with a
temporary training contract, suggesting that these incentives may be more likely to
have an impact on conversions rather than on new hires. This could also explain the
absence of heterogeneity by educational level in our estimates. While they correctly ar-
gued that a potential employer is more likely to exploit an incentive in order to directly
hire individuals with signs of higher productivity (in particular for more educated
workers), this framework is not the best for discussing the effect of the benefits for con-
tract conversions introduced by the 5 October 2012 Decree. The reason is that in this
case, all the eligible workers were already known by the employer, who had already had
time to screen them during the fixed-term contract; therefore their willingness to change
their status to permanent is less likely to depend on signs of external productivity.
Another important difference between the policy set up by law 388/2000 and the one
we studied is that it required the employer to increase the workforce, which can be
particularly crucial during an economic crisis. Clearly, whether a policy maker should
impose or not this additional constraint also depends on the final target of the scheme,
which may aim at increasing overall employment and not only the rate of conversion.
Furthermore, caution is necessary here before drawing any conclusions because we did
not simultaneously observe the two alternative treatments, with and without the con-
straint, and therefore further evidence is needed to evaluate whether it played an im-
portant role.
7 Conclusions
Our exercise suggests that the program introduced by the 5 Oct 2012 Decree was ef-
fective in stimulating conversions. Compared to the counterfactual scenario, conver-
sions increased by 83%. The additional permanent positions came with a cost: to get
one extra permanent job, the government had to finance an additional 1.2 conversions
that would have taken place even without public support.
There is no need to say that the external validity of the experiments to evaluate the
program is wanting. Thus, it is not safe to infer from our results generally valid policy
implications relative to the effectiveness of conversion programs. Having said this, a
number of remarks are in order.
First, the scheme we evaluated shows little sign of perverse conduct by employers.
There is no evidence of strategic behavior intended to bring conversions forward or
backward only to benefit from the scheme. This circumstance might well be explained
Ciani and de Blasio IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:6 Page 25 of 29by the short span of time between announcement and beginning of the program and
by the fact that the shortage of financing might have come earlier than expected (by
the employers).
Secondly, it is very difficult to say whether the amount of the subsidy was appropriate
for converting the greatest possible number of short-term positions. Although higher fi-
nancial support could have spurred additional conversions at the same time, this would
have increased the financial dead-weight loss associated with the conversions that
would have occurred even without the scheme. Therefore, within the budget con-
straints envisaged by 5 Oct 2012 Decree, increasing the subsidy might not necessarily
have helped convert more contracts. If one believes that the employers’ demand for
conversions was fully satisfied at the established amount, then it is not unrealistic to
say that a smaller amount of money could have achieved a similar effect.
Finally, the comparison with the previous tax-credit set up by Law 388/2000 suggests
that incentives for conversions may be more effective than general benefits for hires on
a permanent contract basis because they exploit the stepping-stone effect of fixed-term
contracts. At the same time, the previous policy may have had a slighter aggregate ef-
fect because it imposed the constraint that the employer had to also increase the overall
workforce. Nevertheless, whether to impose this requirement or not depends on the
target of the scheme: a policy maker may be more interested in increasing employment
than in reducing instability.
Endnotes
1In particular, Méndez (2013) criticizes the assumption of Hernanz et al. (2003) that
individuals aged between 30 and 45 could not be hired with the new open-ended con-
tracts. According to Méndez (2013), this is not correct because they actually could if
they had been previously hired as fixed-term workers.
2In 2002 Portugal introduced a scheme of incentives for the conversion of temporary
contracts, but to the best of our knowledge no study has evaluated its effects.
3Note that the program did not introduce any constraint as to the variation in total
workforce following the conversions/stabilizations.
4There are a few exceptions that involve a small number of workers, in particular
contracts for directors that could be signed for 5 years. However, our data are based on
a region that had already been collecting the data for several years before 2008, and
therefore we should be able to observe almost all relevant contracts in 2011 and 2012.
5This selection clears possible distortions generated by the specificity of these con-
tracts. Among eligible fixed term workers in the selected periods in 2012, 71.9% had
standard contracts, and they represented 90.7% of the contracts that were converted
into permanent ones. Our main results carry through to the more general case, where
all these nonstandard contracts are kept in the dataset (apart from those signed with a
temporary employment agency, which were not eligible for the incentive); in this case
the point estimate is smaller, but it is quite close to our main results if measured as a
proportion of the counterfactual. Our findings are also indistinguishable if the public
sector is dropped from the sample. See Additional file 1 for these results.
6We use the information on the educational level in the most recent communication
regarding fixed-term contracts (before the conversion, in case that takes place).
7We censor to 5 years 0.5% of the observations which have a longer elapsed duration.
Ciani and de Blasio IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:6 Page 26 of 298In the specific case, as discussed in the Section 2, some of the firms who made a
conversion expecting to receive the benefit were later excluded on a first come first
served basis. As mentioned, they could not make completely sure that the money was
available for them at the moment of the application, and they could not cancel the con-
version if they found out later on that they were excluded. Therefore, the total number
of subsidies can be lower than the total number of conversions. But this does not pre-
vent us from estimating the effect of the change in incentives on the rate of conversion
by focusing on the eligibility status.
9For a discussion of announcement and implementation effects in diff-in-diffs ana-
lysis, see Blundell et al. (2011).
10We also replicated the estimates defining the age as referring to the end of the
period (see Additional file 1), with no sensible changes for the results.
11We always use standard errors clustered at the employer level to account for poten-
tial common shocks across different job-relationships. We also tried using standard er-
rors clustered by sector of economic activity: all the main results continued to show
statistical significance (see Additional file 1).
12We also do not know the total amount of incentives distributed for conversions in
the Veneto region only and precisely during Period III.
13In the calculation we do not account for the possible presence of an effect in Period IV
as well because any effect could come from a diverging trend for older women, and its
impact is anyway quite insignificant.
14This value is similar to the one that can be obtained by dividing the total amount
spent in Italy by the total number of incentives distributed using the info available
from the Ministry of Labor (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2013).
15We could have used previous years as well. Clearly, if the underlying seasonal
trends did not have any evolution over time, this could allow us to estimate them more
precisely and increase the power in detecting deviations during 2012. However, we do
not expect full comparability over time, also because of the ongoing economic crises,
and therefore we preferred to limit the falsification only to the previous year. This is
also motivated by a question of data tractability, given that the size of the microdata
generated from the administrative archives is quite demanding in terms of memory re-
quirement and processing time.
16One could also combine the falsification over 2011 and the main estimates over
2012 to obtain triple-difference estimates. We also run this joint regression, obtaining
results that are qualitatively similar and support our conclusions. However, given that
in 2011 the interaction terms are generally economically small and not statistically sig-
nificant, we prefer to focus on the diff-in-diffs within 2012 in order to avoid introdu-
cing noise into our main estimates.
17Younger men and women may also move across groups if they turn old (according
to our grouping) during the period of the analysis. Given the limited time span we
focus on, this is not likely to be a major concern.
18In the case of lacking educational level, we kept the observation but we added a
dummy for the missing value. For the sector of activity, there are only 4 missing values
in 2011 that we excluded.
19We also conducted a falsification exercise by using only men aged 30 or over and
splitting them into a “fake eligible group” aged [30,40) and a control group aged 40+.
Ciani and de Blasio IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:6 Page 27 of 29We do not find evidence of an effect of the policy. Note also that if our estimates were
biased by the fact that during the ongoing economic crises older workers are progres-
sively more likely to keep their job, then we should have also found evidence of diverging
trends between these two sub-groups of controls.
20To account for the fact that contracts exit the sample in the period after they are
converted, in Period IV we considered as having an eligible colleague also those who
had an eligible colleague in Period III of the same year.
21We also did the same regression adding four other periods of 16 days at the end.
Interactions are still close to zero and not statistically significant.
22A complete model would also account for the fact that contracts may terminate by
estimating a multinomial logit model that accounts for competing risks. We also did
that, finding virtually the same results for conversion rates. We also found that the ef-
fect seems to come mostly from a reduction in termination rates. However, we prefer
not to stress this additional result, which goes beyond the purpose of the current work
and would require further examination. This is also because the effect on termination
rates is more likely to be spread throughout following periods as well.
23The information on educational qualifications is reported by the employer at the
time of communication to the regional agency. There are 0.7% of the observations with
missing values. Given that for foreign citizens this information is likely to contain
measurement errors, we also reproduced the graph considering only Italian citizens,
but we found no qualitative differences. It must also be added that the falsification over
2011 fails to reject the null that interaction terms Eligible × Period III in all educational
groups are jointly equal to zero, with a p-value of 0.1461.
24We did not consider vocational diplomas, which occupy a particular position between
low and high qualifications. Nevertheless, they involve only around 5.5% of the eligible ob-
servations, and the effect for them is similar to the one for high school graduates.
25Given that the baseline rate of conversions is higher for the most educated, these
results imply a smaller percentage increase for them, although we still fail to reject the
null that the proportional effect is different (with high p-values).
26Running a falsification exercise over 2011 fails to reject the null that interaction
terms Eligible × Period III in all numbers of fixed-term contract categories are jointly
equal to zero, with a p-value of 0.5872.
27As a side-line, results for firms with only one fixed-term contract are an additional
robustness check, given that employers could not substitute between eligible and not
eligible workers.
28We also split the sample according to the number of eligible fixed-term workers.
We found that the impact is positive and statistically significant only for employers with
at most 10 eligible workers; for firms having more than 10 eligible workers, the impact
remains positive (though smaller) and not statistically significant at the 5% level.
29As mentioned in Section 3, our dataset does not allow us to recover the size of the
firm’s workforce. Therefore, we cannot estimate the percentage of small firms among all
contract conversions in Period III. Nevertheless, in Section 5.3 we showed that the effect
was stronger in firms with 1 or 2 fixed-term employees; such firms are likely to be, on
average, smaller.
30To be eligible, individuals hired with (or converted to) permanent contracts should
not have held another open-ended contract in the previous 12 months.
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of the contract because fixed-term contracts lasting less than 12 months counted also
as a fraction of the entire year. Therefore, it was formally possible to increase employ-
ment by simply transforming a 6 month fixed-term contract (counting 6/12) into a per-
manent one (12/12).
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